The Akron Legal News

Life sentence upheld for man who strangled his ex-girlfriend to death

ANNIE YAMSON
Special to the Legal News
Published: May 23, 2014

The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas was affirmed recently when the 9th District Court of Appeals ruled that the lower court had authority over a murder case and the defendant’s counsel was not ineffective.

The defendant, Chad Cobb, was indicted on July 9, 2012, for aggravated murder and kidnapping.

On Aug. 15, 2012, a supplemental indictment charged him with three counts of aggravated murder with capital punishment specifications and one count each of kidnapping, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, retaliation, tampering with evidence, grand theft, abuse of a corpse, possessing criminal tools and domestic violence.

According to a statement from the Summit County Prosecutor’s office, Cobb had killed his former girlfriend, Ashley Biggs.

Biggs was working as a pizza delivery driver when Cobb lured her into an empty office parking lot on the evening of June 20, 2012.

Cobb used a stun gun on Biggs before strangling her to death and then leaving her body in the back seat of an abandoned vehicle in a cornfield in Wayne County.

Court records indicate that Cobb and Biggs were in the midst of a custody battle over their 6-year-old daughter at the time.

Eventually, Cobb pleaded guilty to the charges in the supplemental indictment and the death penalty specifications were dismissed along with the remaining charges.

He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

In his first assignment of error upon direct appeal to the 9th District’s three-judge appellate panel, Cobb argued that the Summit County court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his case because the state “failed to establish that the death occurred in Summit County.”

“We disagree,” wrote Presiding Judge Eve Belfance on behalf of the court of appeals. “Although Mr. Cobb frames his argument in terms of subject-matter jurisdiction, it is actually one of venue.”

Judge Belfance explained that “jurisdiction” refers to a court’s “statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case.”

“By contrast, venue is a fact which must be proved in criminal prosecutions unless it is waived by the defendant,” she wrote.

Generally, a defendant is granted a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, according to the Ohio Constitution.

However, the appellate panel noted that a provision applies to the “mobile offender” whose course of conduct affects a number of jurisdictions.

Ultimately, the court of appeals ruled that the indictment issued against Cobb charged him with committing offenses in Summit County and he pleaded guilty to the charges.

Therefore, he was precluded from challenging the factual issue of venue.

Cobb proceeded to argue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to attend a motion-to-dismiss hearing.

“However, because he pleaded guilty, Mr. Cobb must be able to show that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty but for his counsel’s performance in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance,” wrote Judge Belfance.

The hearing was on a motion to dismiss a complaint filed in the Barberton Municipal Court before Cobb pleaded guilty to his indictment.

The appellate panel ruled that it was unclear how exactly Cobb was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to appear at a hearing more than six months prior to his pleading guilty or how the absence affected his decision to enter a guilty plea. That assignment of error was overruled.

In his last argument, Cobb claimed that the trial court erred when it allowed his retained counsel to withdraw.

According to the record, Cobb had retained his own counsel but, after he failed to pay for the legal services, his attorney moved to withdraw as counsel and requested that he be appointed instead.

The trial court found Cobb to be indigent and indicated that it would take counsel’s request to be appointed under advisement but, in the end, the court appointed a different attorney to Cobb.

“We initially note that Mr. Cobb’s entire argument focuses on the trial court’s decision to allow his original counsel to withdraw as retained counsel, arguing that the trial court failed to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct,” wrote Judge Belfance.

Cobb, however, did not cite any authority that a trial court permitting counsel to withdraw upon request interferes with a defendant’s right to counsel and the appellate panel held that he failed to develop his argument as to how his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.

“We also note that the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them,” wrote Judge Belfance, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez.

Since Cobb did not pay for his retained counsel’s services and was found indigent, he had no right to choose his own appointed counsel, the court of appeals concluded.

After overruling all of his assignments of error, judges Beth Whitmore and Carla Moore joined Judge Belfance in affirming Cobb’s convictions and the judgment of the Summit County court.

The case is cited State v. Cobb, 2014-Ohio-1923.

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