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Summit County burglary conviction vacated for speedy trial violation
TRACEY BLAIR
Legal News Reporter
Published: April 23, 2020
A Summit County trial court violated a man’s right to a speedy trial in a burglary case, according to the 9th District Court of Appeals.
William Stoddard was arrested on the third-degree felony Nov. 6, 2017. He pleaded not guilty at his Dec 1, 2017, arraignment and was released on bond. After Stoddard failed to appear in court, the trial court revoked his bon and issued a capias.
Stoddard was re-arrested on Aug. 23, 2018, and the trial court reinstated the case to its active docket the following day. It then set the trial date as Oct. 11, 2018. Stoddard’s counsel moved to withdraw. The motion was granted and the trial date was vacated.
On Oct. 19, 2018, Stoddard’s new counsel filed a notice of appearance and a demand for discovery. A new trial date was set for Nov. 27, 2018. However, the trial court continued the trial due to a scheduling conflict with another criminal case.
Three days later, the trial court issued a journal entry indicating that – at the request of defense counsel – the trial was being continued until Jan. 8, 2019. The journal entry also indicated that, pending verification of a home address, Stoddard would be released on bond. At a status hearing on Dec. 10, 2018, the trial court indicated that it would not be releasing Stoddard on bond because it could not verify a legitimate home address, and clarified that the prior continuance was a result of the trial court’s unavailability, not Stoddard’s counsel’s request.
The parties then discussed the speedy-trial issue. The state argued that the revocation of Stoddard’s bond restarted the speedy-trial clock, which began to run again on Aug. 24, 2018 - the day after Stoddard’s re-arrest. The state also indicated that the time between when Stoddard’s counsel withdrew and his new counsel filed a notice of appearance (Oct. 11, 2018 to Oct. 19, 2018) tolled the speedy-trial clock.
Lastly, the state alleged the trial court’s continuance of the trial date based upon its unavailability tolled the time until the court’s next available trial date (i.e., Nov. 27, 2018 to Jan. 8, 2019). According to the state’s calculation, the Jan. 8, 2019 trial date was within the speedy trial window.
On Jan. 8, 2018, the scheduled trial date, Stoddard moved to dismiss the case based upon a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion.
Stoddard’s three-day trial began on March 12, 2019, and resulted in a verdict of guilty.
Section 2945.71(C)(2) provides that a person who is accused of a felony shall be brought to trial within 270 days.
Stoddard said the speedy-trial clock began to run the day after he was re-arrested. He argued that it continued to run until he requested a bill of particulars on Oct. 1, 2018.
Stoddard alleged the time between his request for a bill of particulars remained pending but before his counsel withdrew did not count toward his speedy-trial time. Therefore, he calculated he wasn’t brought to trial for 100 days or, under the triple-count provision, 300 days.
He then argued that the defendant in the other criminal case that delayed his ended up pleading guilty the day before his trial, meaning his own trial could have gone forward after all.
The appellate panel agreed with Stoddard on both counts.
“Mr. Stoddard’s counsel consistently maintained that Mr. Stoddard wished to have his trial, and that he was ready to try the case, including on the day the trial court continued the trial,” 9th District Judge Jennifer Hensal said in her opinion. “… The record before this court indicates that Mr. Stoddard remained in jail from Aug. 24, 2018 until Jan. 8, 2019. Even assuming without deciding that the time between Oct. 1, 2018 (when Mr. Stoddard requested a bill of particulars) and Nov. 7, 2018 (when discovery was completed) was tolled, Mr. Stoddard was not brought to trial within 270 days (with each day counting as three under Section 2945.71(E)) of his re-arrest.”
Appellate judges Lynne Callahan and Thomas Teodosio concurred that the conviction should be vacated.
The case is cited State v. Stoddard, 2020-Ohio-893.