The Akron Legal News

High court’s rationale differs from appellate court’s

KEITH ARNOLD
Special to the Legal News
Published: April 29, 2011

The Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned last week that it would not undo the correct judgment of an appellate court based upon a faulty rationale in the circumstance of a custody battle between a child’s biological father and the Indiana couple seeking to adopt the boy.

A 7-0 court let stand the ruling of the 10th District Court of Appeals, dismissing the writ of habeas corpus filed by Jason and Christy Vaughn of Sellersburg, Ind. to compel the child’s biological father, Benjamin Wyrembek of Wauseon, to return the child to them.

The appellate court based its holding on jurisdiction, presumably crediting the father’s argument that under R.C. 2151.23(A)(3), the Lucas County Juvenile Court had “exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code ... to hear and determine any application for a writ of habeas corpus involving the custody of a child.”

“Courts of appeals, however, have been given original jurisdiction in habeas corpus actions by Section 3(B)(1)(c), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution,” the court wrote per curiam.

Wyrembek argued that under the jurisdictional-priority rule, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the habeas corpus case because the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Juvenile Court Division’s jurisdiction was first invoked to decide the custody matter.

Justices based the court’s decision to leave the judgment untouched was based on its decision in State ex rel. Galloway v. Cook, 126 Ohio St.3d 332, 2010-Ohio-3780, 933 N.E.2d 807, which held the Supreme Court would not reverse a correct judgment simply because it was based in whole or in part on an incorrect rationale.

“First, the Vaughns have or had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by appeal from the Lucas County Juvenile Court’s orders granting custody of the child to Wyrembek, ...” the court noted.

“Second, insofar as the Vaughns raise a jurisdictional claim that they either raised or could have raised in their previous, unsuccessful extraordinary-writ actions, res judicata ‘bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action,’” as in Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382, 653 N.E.2d 226, and State ex rel. Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 121 Ohio St.3d 526, 2009-Ohio-1704, 905 N.E.2d 1210, which held that the previous action is conclusive for all claims that were or that could have been litigated in the first action.

“Third, as we held in the Vaughns’ appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Appeals affirming the Lucas County Probate Court’s dismissal of their petition to adopt the child, ‘when an issue concerning (parentage) of a minor is pending in the juvenile court, a probate court must refrain from proceeding with the adoption of that child.’”

Justices additionally found that dismissal of the couple’s habeas corpus petition was appropriate because they did not comply with the pleading requirements of R.C. 2725.04.

Also, they indicated that there is no comparable statutory limitation on child-custody habeas corpus cases. R.C. 2725.03 limits the jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving inmates of state benevolent or correctional institutions to “the courts or judges of the county in which the institution is located,” according to the an appellate ruling in Knecht v. Tate (Dec. 10, 1991), Franklin App. No. 91AP-207, 1991 WL 268340.

“Although the Vaughns’ petition challenges a Lucas County Juvenile Court order compelling them to transfer custody of the child to Wyrembek, they did not attach a copy of that order to their petition,” the Supreme Court observed.

According to case summary, the Vaughns’ habeas corpus petition was based on their institution of an adoption proceeding in Franklin County pursuant to R.C. 3107.04(A). As a result of other pending actions relative to the circumstances of the two parties, Wyrembek’s attorney, Alan Lehenbauer of The McQuades Co. LPA, would not comment on the ruling when contacted by The Daily Reporter.

The Vaughns’ attorney did not respond to an inquiry seeking comment by press deadline. “Based on the foregoing, dismissal of the Vaughns’ habeas corpus petition was appropriate, albeit for different reasons than those expressed by the court of appeals,” the court concluded.

“Therefore, we affirm the judgment dismissing the petition. We deny Wyrembek’s motion for sanctions, however, because the Vaughns’ appeal was not frivolous insofar as the court of appeals’ rationale was incorrect.”

Justice Paul Pfeifer concurred in judgment only.

The case is cited as In re G.T.B., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1789.

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